I. INTRODUCTION
GLOMONET provides global roaming service to users moving from one network to another [1] [2] . Users can enjoy rich and colorful services, such as online shopping, social entertainment, bank transfer and security exchange, with the help of GLOMONET network entities. Roaming service enables mobile user (MU) to use the services extended by home agent (HA) in a foreign agent (FA). Thus, user authentication and key agreement protocol for roaming service plays the very important role in GLOMONET [3] [4] [5] . In particular, the authentication and key agreement protocol for roaming service enables a MU and a FA authenticate each other and agree on a common session key to establish a secure channel over GLOMONET with the help of the HA. During roaming process in GLOMONET, privacy protection, especially focused on user anonymity, is a challenging and essential requirement that the identity of MU is protected against adversaries. Mutual authentication is also a very important security aspect. It requires that MU, FA and HA prove their authenticity to each other before offering any application services in GLOMONET.
To support roaming facility, several authentication and key agreement protocols [6-] have been proposed in GLOMONET. However, many of them have been proved to be insecure against known attacks. Zhu et al. proposed a two-factor authentication scheme but Lee et al. showed that Zhu et al.'s scheme does not achieve mutual authentication and is vulnerable to impersonation attack [6] [7] . Furthermore, Lee et al. proposed a remedy scheme for Zhu et al.'s scheme. But Wu et al. showed that Lee et al.'s scheme fails to provide user anonymity [8] . Wang et al. also introduced a new authentication scheme but Jeon et al. pointed out that Wang et al.'s scheme cannot withstand against forgery attacks and fails to achieve anonymity [9] [10] . Independently, Chang et al. proved Lee et al.' s scheme fails to achieve user anonymity and proposed a new authentication scheme [11] . Unfortunately, Youn et al. found that Change et al.'s scheme cannot provide anonymity [12] . Recently, Zhou et al. proposed a MAKA protocol based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [13] . While Gope et al. pointed out that Zhou et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to reply attacks and insider attack and proposed a new protocol [14] . However, Xu et al. showed that Gope et al.'s protocol is susceptible to replay attack and have a large storage burden with some more problems and proposed a new novel efficient MAKA protocol with desynchronization for anonymous roaming service in GLOMONET [15] .
There are two purposes of this paper, to show deficiencies of Xu et al.'s protocol and to propose a new remedy MAKA protocol. Xu et al.'s protocol is lightweight but has a protocol flaw and is susceptible to off-line identifier and password guessing attack, stolen verifier attack and denial of service (DoS) attack. We utilize symmetric cryptosystem to implement pseudonym identifier in each session, which can achieve anonymity. Therefore, the proposed protocol could achieve more secure properties compared to the other well-known MAKA protocols but has a bit more overhead to draw some more functions to be secure enough.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we provide a brief overview of GLOMONET and Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol. Section III provides an attack model and security flaws in Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol. Sections IV and V propose an enhanced MAKA protocol to solve the weaknesses in Xu et al.'s protocol with the security and performance analysis. Finally, Section VI provides the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUNDS
This section provides an overview of the target network and Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol [15] . The purpose of this section is to withdraw security flaws in Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol.
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A. Global Mobility Network
Increased use of digital communication systems including cellular phones has led to support the roaming service in GLOMONET. Mobility is a function, which enables a MU to access the services of foreign network (FN) while roaming [16] . In GLOMONET, MUs can access their home network (HN) services from remote places with the help of FA. Authenticity of the MUs plays a crucial role to gain the access to the network services. In roaming scenario, there are three entities, MU, FA and HA. MUs in GLOMONETs visit FN, the role of FN is to authenticate MU with the help of HA as shown in Fig. 1 .
B. Xu et al.'s MAKA Protocol
Xu et al. proposed a MAKA protocol as a remedy scheme of Gope et al.'s protocol [15] . This subsection reviews Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol. Table 1 shows the notations used in this paper.
Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol is consisted of four phases, registration phase, mutual authentication and key agreement phase, password renewal phase and shared key renewal phase.
[Registration phase] In this phase, MU uses real identity to register in HA through secure channel. After registration, MU gets a SC, which stores the authentication information. The details are
Step 1: MU sends his/her identity ID M to HA through the secure channel.
Step [17] . We will show that Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol is weak against off-line identifier and password guessing attack, stolen verifier attack and denial of service attack with a protocol flaw.
A. Dolev-Yao Attack Model
The motivation of Dolev-Yao model is to verify public key protocols against active attacks with considerable power [17] . In their model, following attacker assumptions are  Adversary has complete control over the entire network  Adversary acts as a legitimate user and can obtain any message from any party  Adversary can initiate the protocol with any party and can be a receiver to any party in the network.
Furthermore, we add two more assumptions to Dolev-Yao model that are for the proper cryptanalysis of MAKA protocol as follows  Adversary may obtain all the sensitive parameters stored in SC's by monitoring the power consumption of it if adversary could steal MU's SC [18]  Adversary can steal the verification table from HA.
B. Security Weakness in Xu et al.'s MAKA Protocol
This section shows the security weaknesses of Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol, which will shows that adversary can mount different types of attacks on the MAKA protocol based on Dolev-Yao attack model with two additional assumptions described in the subsection 3.1. Firstly, we will show a flaw in Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol and will show three security weaknesses in it.
[Protocol Flaw] A security protocol is a concrete protocol that performs a security related function and applies cryptographic methods. It should be a sufficiently detailed protocol, which can be used to implement multiple and interoperable versions of a program [19] . However, Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol is incomplete because it does not define FID properly but just used to form FID * in step 3 of the message authentication and key agreement phase. That is the reason why we would like to change D into FID for the proper protocol run. Moreover, we assumed that the attacker stole MU's SC. Thus, the attacker could get the messages, (1) and (2) until the correct password is withdrawn. 
[Denial of Service Attack]
This attack is a cyber-attack in which the perpetrator seeks to make a resource unavailable to its intended users by disrupting services of a host. The password renewal phase only changes without checking the ownership of MU. That is the reason why any attacker could try to perform that phase with any PSW Mi and PSW Mi * pair when MU temporarily vacate his/her system with SC. The attacker performs denial of service attack as follows. (1 The design goals of our enhanced MAKA protocol are as follows  To achieve mutual authentication with the provision of anonymity  To establish the session key fairly  To resist common attacks, such as guessing attack, lost smart card attack, denial of service attack and so on  To provide user friendliness of password change  To achieve computational and communicational efficiency.
Enhanced MAKA protocol is composed of three phases, registration phase, mutual authenticated key agreement phase and password renewal phase. Enhanced MAKA protocol does not need to have the shared key renewal phase because the key is updated once in the mutual authenticated key agreement phase run. In the registration phase, MU registers any specific services to HA by using real identity through secure channel. Unlike Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol, enhanced MAKA protocol does not need to use a verifier table in HA, which improves the security of the protocol. The mutual authenticated key agreement phase provides mutual authentication and key agreement. In this phase, MU and FA can authenticate each other with the assistance of HA with a proper session key establishment. The password renewal allows MU to update the password without the supervision of HA only after the proper MU authentication.
A. Registration Phase
In this phase, MU registers his/her identity to HA and HA issues MU a SC to be used in the further phases. The whole processes of this phase require to be processed through a secure channel. Fig. 2 depicts the processes of this phase, which are given in detail as follows
Step 1: MU selects and sends his/her real identity ID M to HA.
Step 2: After receiving ID M , HA generates a random number n 0 and computes The important feature in this phase is that it does not need to keep ID M and n 0 in HA side for the further processing of the protocol, which could enhance the security of the protocol.
B. Mutual Authenticated Key Agreement Phase
In this phase, MU and FA can establish a session key only after mutual authentication is successful with the assistance of HA. It uses the dynamic identity to achieve anonymity of MU. Fig. 3 depicts the processes of this phase, which are given in detail as follows 
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This phase regularly updates MU's dynamic identity and secret key between MU and HA. These features could enhance anonymity of user and security of the protocol. [15] .
C. Password Renewal

A. Security Analysis
The security analysis is performed based on the Dolev-Yao model with two more assumptions as described in Section 3.1. We solved the issues in Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol mentioned in Section 3.2. Unlike Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol and Gope et al.'s protocol, the proposed protocol does not need to consider the stolen verifier attack. Thereby, as shown in Table 2 , the proposed enhanced MAKA protocol provides more secure and efficient properties. In addition, in order to achieve accurate measurement, we performed an experiment. This experiment was performed using the Crypto++ Library [20] on a system using the 64-bits Windows 7 operating system, 3.2 GHz processor, 4 GB memory, Visual C++ 2013 Software, the SHA-1 hash function and the AES symmetric encryption/decryption function. We summarize the results as shown in Table 3 . Gope et al.
From Table 3 , we could know that the proposed enhanced MAKA protocol has a bit more overheads than the other two protocols. It is mainly due to provide ownership check for SC, remove the verification table for HA and renewal of the dynamic identity to MAKA, which are the security costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an enhanced MAKA protocol in GLOMONET after showing the security problems in Xu et al.'s MAKA protocol. First of all, we showed a protocol flaw and three security weaknesses in Xu et al.'s protocol. The proposed enhanced MAKA protocol solved the problems in Xu et al.'s protocol efficiently by adopting ownership check, removing the verification table and renewing the dynamic identity periodically as shown in Table 2 . However, it gets a bit of overhead due to the security provision functionalities as shown in Table 3 .
